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"An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot
for a foot."1
According to the concept of proportionality, as rooted in Jewish
Scriptures, solely non-excessive forceful measures may be utilized to
achieve an objective.2 The analysis of proportionality, a basic principle
of customary international humanitarian law, is conducted on a fact-
specific basis.3 Although there is no objective, definitive test under
international law that adequately defines proportionality, this concept
can be adumbrated by various models and standards in international
legal jurisprudence that will be evaluated in this paper.
As applied in the context of warfare, the proportionality
principle prohibits members of the military from conducting "attacks in
* Assistant Counsel, New York State Legislative Bill Drafting Conuission. The author
acknowledges the feedback of the fellow participants at the 2013 National Security Law
Faculty Workshop at South Texas College of Law, where this paper was discussed. The
author additionally dedicates this scholarship to Lee Medows, Ariella Michal Medows,
Shirley Kahn, and Naomi Suberi-Busany.
1 Exodus 21:24.
2 Todd Landman, Imminence and Proportionality: The U.S. and U.K Responses to
Global Terrorism, 38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 75, 84-85 (2007).
3 Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102
AM. J. INT'L L. 715, 761 (2008).
U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV.
which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in relation to the
anticipated military advantage gained." 4 In accordance with
technological changes in modem warfare, such as the proliferation of
cyber attacks, this paper explores how to assess compliance with regard
to the use of force under the proportionality principle in conjunction
with international humanitarian law and the applicable rules of
engagement that operate within it.5
Part I of the paper explores the concept of proportionality as
interpreted through a variety of legal frameworks by engaging in
comparative legal models. Part II addresses the role of proportionality
analysis in jus in bello and jus ad bellum, and highlights proposed legal
frameworks for conducting these analyses. Part III addresses the role of
proportionality analysis with regard to self-defense in a military
context. Part IV explores the modem challenges posed by conducting a
proportionality analysis within the context of applicable rules of
engagement and international humanitarian law, and discusses
relevant juridical standards for evaluating the sufficiency of a
proportionality analysis.
I. DEFINING PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS
The concept of proportionality is evaluated distinctively among
various international legal cultures. Proportionality jurisprudence
stems from German law, dating back three centuries.6 German jurists
understand the application of the proportionality principle to
encompass an ordering of constitutional values; as such, when there is a
4 Laurie R. Blank, Rules of Engagement: Law, Strategy and Leadership 1, 9 (Emory
Public Law Research Paper No. 11-168, 2012), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1872505 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 art. 51 (5)(b), and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, adopted by Conference June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(prohibiting any "attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.")),
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.")).
5 Id. at 4-5.
6 Margit Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of Unreasonableness and
Proportionality Review of the Administration in the United Kingdom, 58 AM. J. COMP.
L. 583, 608-09 (2010).
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conflict in German law between interests and rights, "the main concern
of proportionality, then, is to determine which of the interests best
further the ultimate shared goals of the constitutional order." 7
Consequently, German proportionality analysis does not require
differentiation between competing constitutional priorities.8 Rather, by
evaluating rights under a tripartite model,9 German jurists consider
whether the desired outcome of an action was suitable; whether the
severity of the undertaken action was necessary under a means
analysis; and whether the collective benefits of an action outweighed
any injury to the petitioner.10
Proportionality in Germany is distinguished from
proportionality in other legal systems by three significant factors. First,
although other legal systems focus on identifying a goal or conducting
an ends-means analysis, the German method of determining
proportionality focuses primarily on the actual balancing per se.11
Second, German jurists examine which of the rights or values further
the German constitutional order by upholding human dignity. Finally,
the proportionality analysis is conducted in an ad hoc manner. 12
In the European Union, proportionality has been utilized in
international public law, and has become a "powerful procedural
tool." 13 Member states of the European Union are subject to the
principles of proportionality and necessity under the European Union
Founding Treaties and the Treaty of Lisbon. 14 In Europe, the concept of
proportionality encompasses three distinct connotations: the
relationship between the objective and the means undertaken to reach
that objective; whether there are appropriate alternative means
available; and whether the rendered judgment is proportionate to the
Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: the
Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 367,
392-93 (2009).
8 Id.
9 Cohn, supra note 6, at 609.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of 'Law' in Global Administrative Law, 20 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 23, 33 (2009).
14 Cohn, supra note 6, at 610.
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wrongdoing.15 The European Court of Justice and the European Court
of Human Rights have recognized the role of proportionality in their
jurisprudence. 16 The European Court of Justice's proportionality
analysis is similar to the American least restrictive means test.17
In order to ascertain whether state actions are proportionate,
the European Court of Justice established a three-prong test. First, the
purpose of a proposed measure or regulation must actually be imbued
within the power of the governmental authority taking action. Second,
the means themselves used to implement the regulation cannot be
inappropriate. Finally, the regulation must be implemented through the
least restrictive measures available.18
European jurisprudence accepts the distinct "margin of
appreciation" doctrine, under which tribunals allocate to governmental
entities "a degree of leeway in applying obligations or limitations"
when evaluating the rights of disputing parties.19 The European Court
of Human Rights first employed the margin of appreciation doctrine in
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5 (1976), in which
the court held that governments could better assess moral regulations
than the court because of international differences.20 The European
Court of Justice recognizes the concept of a "margin of appreciation"
under the term "area of discretion."21
Countries that currently integrate the concept of proportionality
into their jurisprudence include: Ireland, South Africa, Israel, Australia,
and New Zealand, inter alia.22 Arguably, "the United States is the last
system in the West to resist the appeal of the proportionality
15 Richard G. Singer, Proportionate Thoughts About Proportionality, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRiM. L. 217, 218 (2010) (reviewing E. Thomas Sullivan & Richard S. Frase,
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS (Oxford University Press 2008)).
16 Cohn, supra note 6, at 611.
17 Nathan Horst, Creating an Ever Closer Union: The European Court of Justice and
the Threat to Cultural Diversity, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 165, 195 (2008) (citing
U.S. v. Carolene, 304 U.S. 144 (1938)).
Franck, supra note 3, at 753-54.
1 Id. at 760.
Id. at 761 (citing Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 5 (1976)).
21 Cohn, supra note 6, at 611-12.
22 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 7, at 381.
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doctrine." 23 The debate in the United States regarding the role of
proportionality in American jurisprudence is referred to as "the
question of American exceptionalism." 24 Proponents of this model
believe that American law is distinct from other international legal
systems, and it is thus inapposite to study foreign jurisprudence to
develop American constitutional analysis. 25 Under the methodological
view of exceptionalism, whose proponents include Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia, American constitutional analysis is derived from
a categorical approach that focuses on specific constitutional rights and
whether those rights were abrogated.26 This inquiry is distinct from the
European law's two-fold evaluation. The European model first
examines whether a right was infringed upon, and then inquires
whether the government met its burden of persuasion that the objective
was legitimate and that the means used were proportionate. 27
Opponents of the American exceptionalism model, who include
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, counter that American
jurisprudence does not differ too markedly from other legal systems,
and respond to similar challenges. 28
In contrast to the American legal system, Canadian
jurisprudence is more accepting of the proportionality analysis. In
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.),2 9 the Supreme
Court of Canada wrote that it needed to balance between competing
principles in order to consider the entire Constitution and its values.30
The case serves as evidence that contrary to American fears that "a
similar subsequent adoption of the European organic conception of the
state" could emerge from adopting the principle of proportionality, in
Canada, "proportionality facilitates the infiltration of continental
constitutional ideas into a common law judicial system." 31
23 id.
24 Id. at 374.
25 id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 374-75, 385-86.
28 Id. at 375, 381.
29 Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
30 Id. at 220, 260.
31 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 7, at 412 (citing Reference re Secession of Que.,
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.)).
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In the New Zealand cases, which were heard together, Ministry
of Transp. v. Noort Police v. Curran, [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA), the
Wellington Court of Appeal incorporated Canadian law regarding
proportionality into its own jurisprudence. 32 The court held that the
means to further a desired governmental objective "must be reasonable
and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."33 The
court defined its implementation of proportionality as requiring "a
rational connection between the measures and the objective," and
identified the need for the least possible impairment of a right or
freedom. 34 The court expounded that "the deleterious effects of the
measures must be justifiable in light of the objective which they are to
serve." 35
The High Court of Ireland also applied the proportionality
principle in An Blascaod Mor Teoranta v. Comm'rs of Pub. Works., [1998]
I.E.H.C. 71. The court held that for a measure to be "regarded as
necessary in a democratic society," it must be "proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued." 36 In conjunction with proportionality, the
court noted the importance of safeguarding fundamental rights and
balancing whether an infringement on a right was permissible due to a
"pressing social need." 37
Finally, the United States is not the only legal system
worldwide that ostensibly rejects the proportionality analysis as part of
its legal system. Japan is similar to the United States in rejecting the
European proportionality analysis, as Japan does not overtly employ a
widespread proportionality test in its legal system.38 Rather, the
violation of Japanese constitutional rights is illegal only if the
government acted in an unreasonable or irrational manner.39 Japanese
jurisprudence is not concerned with the correlation between the
32 Ministry of Transp. v Noort; Police v Curran [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA).
3 3 id.
34 Id.
35 id.
36 Blascaod Mor Teoranta v. Comm'rs of Pub. Works in Ireland, [1998] I.E.H.C. 71,
150 [1998].
37 Id.
38 Craig Martin, Glimmers of Hope: The Evolution of Equality Rights Doctrine in
Japanese Courts from a Comparative Perspective, 20 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 167,
245-46 (2010).
39 Id. at 244.
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objective of an asserted goal and the means employed to achieve that
goal.40 However, proportionality analysis has become more prevalent
in dissenting opinions in Japanese jurisprudence, suggesting the
development of case law upon the subject.41
II. EVALUATING PROPORTIONALITY IN JUS IN BELLO AND JUS AD BELLUM
In the context of warfare, a proportionality analysis
encompasses a balance between protecting human rights and the need
for military action.42 International humanitarian law, also known as the
law of war and the law of armed conflict,43 limits the means and
methods of force, as the only legitimate purpose of military force is to
"weaken the military forces of the enemy." 4 4
In the context of the law of warfare, sources for proportionality
stem from just war theory45 and the bifurcation between jus in bello,
which pertains to conduct during hostilities, and jus ad bellum, which
refers to the commencement of such hostilities.46 In hlitary and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14 (June 27), the
International Court of Justice held that even though Nicaragua
instigated actions to which the United States responded, this response
was illegitimate, as Nicaragua's actions did not constitute an armed
attack to which the United States could respond with defensive action.47
The Nicaraguan court declared its power to evaluate whether force
exerted during jus ad bellum was justified on an individualized basis,
dependent upon the facts of the case.48
The legality of measures taken in the context of jus in bello is
independent from the initial legality of the use of force.49 JUS in bello
constraints apply to the types of weapons used and whether or not the
40 Id.
41
42 Blank, supra note 4, at 6.
43 Id. at 4.
44 Id. at 6.
45 Landman, supra note 2, at 83.
46 Franck, supra note 3, at 719-23.
47 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
481 Id. at 720-21.
49 Id. at 723.
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use of those weapons is excessive.50 Under the Geneva Conventions,
weapons may not cause excessive suffering to individuals, and article
35(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
provides that it "is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment."5 1
To examine proportionality of force under jus in bello, scholars
have adopted three models: the "tit-for-tat-test," the "cumulative test,"
and the "deterrent proportionality test." Under the "tit-for-tat-test," the
amount of force used must be limited in proportion to the amount of
force in the preceding attack, as evaluated in terms of deaths and
property destruction.52 Under the "cumulative test," an inquiry into
whether a military response is proportional encompasses both
immediate and continuing acts of aggression.53 Notably, this approach
does not encompass either general or specific deterrence; there must be
a rough equivalence with regard to casualties and property damages. 54
The third test is the "deterrent proportionality test," under which
responding force is evaluated together with the goal of deterring future
use of force against the state.55 Under this test, a state could lawfully use
more force than was used by an initial aggressor, with the goal of
preventing future attacks.56
Some scholars propose combining the legal standards into a
flexible and cumulative rubric in which "military retaliation is weighed
against the immediately preceding attacks as well as the probability
and magnitude of future attacks."57 This test is arguably the most
appropriate standard to apply to the conflicts faced by modern
democracies that deal with the all-too realistic threat of terrorism. It
would be infeasible to suggest that such states should refuse to protect
" Id. at 725.
5
'Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, art. 35 (3), June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I
(1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
52 Zachary Myers, Fighting Terrorism: Assessing Israel's Use of Force in Response to
Hezbollah, 45 SANDIEGOL. REV. 305, 324 (2008).
53 Id. at 326 (2008).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 327.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 328.
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their citizens until after these states are attacked in order to ascertain
just how much force would be proportionate, and hence, lawful.
Further, this amalgamated standard may be applicable to modern
security challenges due to the international nature of terrorism, the
barriers to negotiations with terrorists, and the large supply of those
willing to commit acts of terrorism.58
III. PROPORTIONALITY AND SELF-DEFENSE IN THE MILITARY
The use of force must be distinguished between measures
undertaken with the larger goal of defending a nation from an
existential threat as opposed to those undertaken with a specific
military objective. 59 In the former situation, proportionality constraints
may not limit the use of defensive force, as even an "extreme measure
might be justified" in the quest for state survival.60 However, regarding
the latter situation, the issue of proportionality may be disputed due to
the decreased necessity that would justify the use of force in a particular
situation.61
The use of force is regulated under international humanitarian
law, as the rules of war, the Geneva Conventions, and customary law
apply to every situation of armed conflict. 62 Prohibitions on the
disproportionate use of force include the International Committee of
the Red Cross Commentary on Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol I of the
Geneva Convention63 and the International Criminal Court Statute
Article 8(2)(b)(iv).M The Commentary on Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol I of
the Geneva Convention, which addresses injuries to civilians, stipulates
that military measures for which there is a vague or general advantage
should not be implemented if they would incur civilian casualties.6
58 id.
Fletcher, supra note 47, at 532.
60 d.
61 Id
62 Blank, supra note 4, at 4-5.
63 Amichai Cohen, The Principle of Proportionality in the Context of Operation Cast
Lead: Institutional Perspectives, June 2009, 1, 30, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1423254&download=yes.
64 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, Art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
65 Cohen, supra note 63, at 30.
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The concept of proportionality as utilized in the context of
national self-defense differs from the standard of proportionality for
armed conflict under international law, which focuses on the
minimization of collateral damage. 66 The proportionality principle is
critical in analyzing compliance under applicable rules of engagement,
and despite their differences, laws regarding warfare are similar to
those regarding self-defense.67 The ICC has a high threshold for
determining breaches of proportionality; for example, Article 8(2)(b)(iv)
of the ICC Rome Statute forbids "clearly excessive" conduct.68 The
definition of self-defense may be particularized according to national
laws and specific rules of engagement.69 These rules are issued by
states' militaries and stipulate the conditions under which force may be
used. 70
A state may resort to self-defense solely when non-forceful
measures are not a viable option and the hostile act or intent remains
present. All proportional means of self-defense in terms of "nature,
duration, and scope of force" can be utilized (subject to limits under
applicable rules of engagement). 71 Proportionality analysis is a focal
feature in determining the legality of self-defense; the traditional
standard for the justification of self-defense under international law is
when "the necessity of the self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." 72
International law limits self-defense in the context of rules of
engagement, as such, force used in self-defense may only be exercised
proportionate to the "intensity, duration, and magnitude of force to
what reasonably is required to counter the attack or threat of attack." 73
66 ALAN COLE ET AL., INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAw, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
HANDBOOK 1, 3-4 (2009), available at https://www.usnwc.edu/
getattachment/7b0d0f70-bb07-48f2-afOa-7474e92d0bb0/San-Remo-ROE-Handbook.
67 Fletcher, supra note 47, at 531.
68 Cohen, supra note 63, at 35.
69 COLE, supra note 66, at 3.
70 COLE, supra note 66, at 1.
71 Id. at 3-4.
72 Amos Guiora, The Military Commissions Act of 2009: Pre-empting Terror
Bombings-A Comparative Approach to Anticipatory Self-Defense, 41 U. TOL. L. REV.
801, 816 (2010) (citations omitted).
73 Major Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training,
Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 3, 30 (1994).
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Critically, when evaluating the proportionality of prospective forceful
measures, civilians may not be disproportionately endangered.74
International legal sources for national self-defense in the
context of proportionality, as applied in combat, include Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter, which adds an exception to the Article 2(4)
general prohibition on force.75 While Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter broadly precludes the legitimization of one state's forceful
measures against that of another state, Article 51 provides an exception
when the force is deployed for defensive purposes.76 Article 51
authorizes the use of defensive force only in the case of a substantial
armed attack.77 Such attacks are described in the Article as a
"qualitatively grave use of force." 78 Generally, a state may take
international defensive action only after the instigating state has already
used force.79 The presumption of legality is strengthened if the
defending state's territory was threatened.80 Proportionate defensive
force can also be considered legitimate when it is in response to threats
against political independence.81 The proportionality requirement
continues to encompass the "respect for the sovereignty of the targeted
state as far as the effective prevention it poses permits." 82
Article 31 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court expressly mentions the need for proportionality in conjunction
with self-defense.83 Under the statute, the lawfulness of military
measures should be determined by balancing the advantages of forceful
measures against casualties, rather than by narrowly focusing on the
74 Fletcher, supra note 47, at 531.
Franck, supra note 3, at 719.
76 id.
Guiora, supra note 72, at 817.
78 James A. Green & Francis Grimal, The Threat of Force as an Action in Self-Defense
under International Law, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 286, 300 (2011).
79 Derek W. Bowett, SELF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (Manchester University
Press 1958).
soId. at 29.
sid. at 84.
82 Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, The George W Bush Administration: A
Retrospective: The "Bush Doctrine": Can Preventive War be Justified?, 32 HARV. J. L.
& PuB. POL'Y 843, 865 (2009).
83 Fletcher, supra note 47, at 531.
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number of deaths.8 4 The balancing model is flawed due to its inherent
subjectivity and because of the argument that "whenever there is a
military scenario with asymmetric capabilities, the principle of necessity
should become subordinate to the principle of proportionality." 85
IV. CHALLENGES IN EVALUATING THE PROPORTIONALITY OF MODERN
WARFARE IN THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LEGAL
FRAMEWORK, AND EXAMINING APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARDS
The concept of proportionality must be utilized in a realistic
and practical manner. Current rules of engagement arguably
"overemphasize proportionality while largely ignoring and thereby
inhibiting the soldier's right to self-defense." 86 Many rules of
engagement are impracticable in their current form. This fact was
evidenced in the battlefield in Iraq, where soldiers could not lawfully
defend themselves adequately, lacking the time to determine if a person
was a civilian or a combatant.87 It follows that "even when defined,
terms 'that confound even seasoned scholars of international law' are
difficult for a twenty-year-old solider with limited armed combat
experience to understand and apply in an instant."88
To address relevant standards of proportionality, rules of
engagement must take into account the changing face of warfare,
including the threat of cyber attacks, a modern method of warfare that
can damage critical, wide-reaching infrastructure.89 Cyber attacks,
84 Symposium, When Does Collateral Damage Rise to the Level of a War Crime?:
Expanding the Adequacy of Laws of War Against Contemporary Human Rights
Discourse, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 679, 699 (2008).
'Id. at 700.
86 Karen P. Seifert, Note, Interpreting the Law of War: Rewriting the Rules of
Engagement to Police Iraq, 92 MINN. L. REV. 836, 882 (2008).
87 Id. at 856.
Id. at 856-77 (quoting C. Peter Dungan, Rules of Engagement and Fratricide
Prevention: Lessons from the Tarnak Farms Incident, 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 301, 312 (2004)).
See Dan Rivers, On the Frontline of Cyber Warfare, CNN TECH (Nov. 4, 2010, 4:48
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/web/10/28/malaysia.cyber.security/index.html
("In the future, warfare may shift from a battlefield to a keyboard. Superpowers might
deem a nuclear exchange too destructive, but already they are developing Weapons of
Mass Disruption; software viruses that are designed to cripple the operating systems of
power stations, dams, traffic lights and public transport.").
12 V. 22
PROPORTIONALITY 2.0
which are modern forceful measures, differ from more conventional
acts of warfare. 90 The current legal framework that regulates warfare
under international law, as established by the Geneva Conventions, is
not relevant because the laws in their current form do not adequately or
appropriately address the current, cutting-edge challenges posed by
cyber warfare,91 although Articles 2(4) and 39 of the Charter of the
United Nations may provide a lawful basis for defense of cross-border
cyber attacks.92
In today's era with its ever-growing potential for new
technological threats, liberal democracies "suffer a disproportionate
number of terrorist attacks," resulting from the "natural tension
between the values of liberal democracy and the need for greater
security." 93 There appears to be a "trade-off between the risk of future
terrorist attacks" and balancing "the curbing of civil liberties." 94 The
resounding question is, what actions may a state take to proportionally
and lawfully defend its territory?
A case study of a state that currently faces this very dilemma is
Israel, which grapples between the dichotomy of balancing the modern
democratic values advanced by the nation's widely acknowledged
liberal Supreme Court, and the contemporaneous need for defense
from the serious and realistic threat of terrorism.95 States that struggle
with security challenges similar to those faced by Israel must grapple
90 See William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy,
89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 99 (2010); see also Kim Zetter, Former NSA Director: Countries
Spewing Cyberattacks Should be Held Responsible, WIRED (Jul. 29, 2010, 3:52 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/hayden-at-blackhat/.
91 Deborah B. Medows, The Sound of Silence: The Legality of the American "Kill
Switch Bill, " 4 CASE W. RES. J. L. TECH. & INTERNET 59, 62 (2012) (citing Patricia
Donovan, Cyberwars: Already Underway with No Geneva Conventions to Guide Them,
UNIV. OF BUFFALO NEWS CTR. (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.buffalo.edu/news/11862).
92 Id. (citing Antonio Segura-Serrano, Internet Regulation and the Role of International
Law, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 191, 221 (2006)).
93 Landman, supra note 2, at 85-86.
9 4 Id at 87.
9 In the interest of full disclosure, this author served as a Foreign Law Clerk to Justice
Neal Hendel at the Supreme Court of Israel in 2011. This article solely reflects the
views and scholarship of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the
Court.
2014 13
U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV V
with the question of to what extent the country's military may lawfully
employ force to protect its citizenry.
In 2006, Israel responded to attacks by an armed terrorist
group, Hezbollah,96 by stating that the presence of civilians "will not
render military objects immune from attack for the mere reason that it is
impossible to bombard them without causing injury to the other non-
combatants." 97 After other states accused Israel of violating the precept
of proportionality, the salient inquiry was whether Israel's
countermeasures had to be limited in a scope proportionate to the latest
raid by Hezbollah or to the totality of hostilities imparted upon Israel
over a number of years.98 Notably, Israel did not ratify the Additional
Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, the only Protocol that
contains an express requirement regarding proportionality, although
this requirement could be binding under international customary law.99
Assuming that Israel does need to comply with proportionality
requirements under international law, the question remains as to how
Israel's modern military can lawfully protect the country from current
threats, in conjunction with the proportionally principle, while
deterring prospective ones. Israel is surrounded by enemy states that
have posed risks to its very existence since the 1948 War of
Independence,100 and the country faces threats of intrastate terrorist
attacks.101 Meanwhile, Iran has threatened to "wipe Israel off the
96 See Jonathan Masters, Hezbollah, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (November 7,
2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155
("The U.S. government and its European allies consider Hezbollah a global terrorist
threat and a menace to regional stability.").
97 Franck, supra note 3, at 732-33 (citations omitted).
9
'Id. at 733.
9 Id. at 734.
100 See Worried Israel: Encircled by Enemies Again?, TIH EcoNOMIST (November 7,
2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.economist.com/node/18186996.
101 See Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles
(Sept 1993), ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (November 7, 2013, 6:00 PM),
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Suicide%/"20and%/20
Other o20Bombing o20Attacks o20in o2OIsrael o2OSince.aspx.
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map," 102 and Israel understands Iran's developing nuclear capabilities
to be a threat to its existence and regional stability.103
One measure to potentially evaluate the proportionality of
force as used by the Israel Defense Forces is to apply the Learned Hand
formula.104 Under this method, precautions should be taken if it is
"cheaper, economically and morally, for a person responsible for
creating the harm to take certain precautions against injury than it is for
someone who is likely to be harmed and whose injury will be
extensive."105 As applied to international law, a strike is not precluded
when "an armed response is more likely to reduce loss of life through
narrowly targeted strikes."106 As such, under the rubric of the Learned
Hand formula, Israel would comply with the international requirement
of proportionality if more lives would be saved by targeting terrorists
than by incurring loss of lives from failure to take action.
Other countries similarly facing the existential threat of
terrorism have considered various factors in addressing the amounts of
force that their militaries may proportionally use to protect their
citizens. Such factors used to weigh the proportionality quotient include
evaluating "the nature of the measures" aims, the nature of the right(s)
the measure infringes, and whether the individuals or groups the
measure targets are objects of antipathy and negative stereotypes or
lack political power."107
102 See Nazila Fathi, Wipe Israel 'Off the Map' Iranian Says, N.Y. TiMES (November 7,
2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht-
iran.html? r-0.
103 See At UN, Israel Insists Tough Sanctions Must Remain to Deter Iranian
Nuclear Threat, UN NEWS CTR. (November 7, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=46167&Cr-general+debate&Crl=#.UnOtcpo75o
("'Iran wants to be in a position to rush forward to build nuclear bombs before the
international community can detect it and much less prevent it,' he [Netanyahu]
continued, expressing his belief that recent pledges from Iran's new President to
cooperate with the international community on the issue are 'a ruse."').
104 Saad Gul and Katherine M. Royal, Burning the Barn to Roast the Pig?
Proportionality Concerns in the War on Terror and the Damadola Incident, 14
WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DispuTE RES. 49, 52 (2006).
10 5 Id. at 66.
106 Id.
107 Lise Johnson, "You can Violate the Rights of Undocumented Persons with
Impunity": The Shocking Message Arizona's Constitution Sends and its Inconsistency
with International Law, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 491, 515 (2010).
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In order to evaluate whether states' military's actions are
proportional under international humanitarian law, judicial systems
must consider a variety of factors. Judicial review of military actions
regarding proportionality is extremely rare, resulting from the
subjectivity of the actions themselves.108 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No.
IT-95-14-T, Judgment of Trial Chamber, ¶507 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), was the only significant case in the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
where lack of proportionality was a consideration in the defendant's
conviction.109 Due to the ambiguity in ascertaining whether a measure
was proportional, the Prosecutor's Office of the ICTY declared that it
would only prosecute cases involving disproportionality where "the
excessiveness of the incidental damage was obvious"110 and "the
relative number of civilian deaths [are] so clearly disproportional that
no reasonable military commander could argue its legitimacy."111
In judging ex post facto whether the civilian casualties incurred
as a result of military force were proportional, investigations should be
conducted by qualified military personnel.112 This method of
determining the proportionality of military force is sensible, as those
who are trained in warfare and are familiarized with first-hand
experience about the practical implementation of the rules of
engagement would comprehend to what extent others had complied
with those rules. As discussed above, under international humanitarian
law, actions may be deemed to be proportionate even if civilians were
killed, but it is critical that civilians may not be deliberately targeted.113
Another method of judicially evaluating proportionality was
recognized in the 2003 ICTY Prosecutor v. Galic', No. IT-98-29-A, ¶¶6-7
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006). The Galic'
Court formed a reasonable person standard in conjunction with
108 Cohen, supra note 63, at 34-35.
109 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment of Trial Chamber,
¶ 507 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000)).
110 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Questioning Civilian Immunity, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 453, 489
(2008) (citing Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor, June 13,
2000, para. 21).
n. Fellmeth, supra note 105, at 489.
112 Cohen, supra note 63, at 36-37.
113 Guiora, supra note 72, at 826.
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international law. 114 It reasoned that rather than evaluating a case in
hindsight, jurists need to consider whether a person in the same
circumstances as the defendant would have "expected excessive civilian
casualties to result from the attack." 115 The ICTY further developed the
reasonable person standard, holding that the method to determine
lawfulness of proportionality is justification "by military necessity." 116
As discussed above, the practicality of this decision is questionable,
given the right of soldiers to self-defense, 117 and the impracticability of
such rules of engagement in their current form.118
In Isayeva v. Russ, App. No. 57950/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), the
European Court of Human Rights established a four-pronged test to
assess the proportionality of military actions. 119 These criteria included
the independence of the investigating body, the ability to appropriately
remedy any wrongdoing, the punctuality of the investigation, and the
public's ability to scrutinize the matter. 120 Complicating this ostensibly
straightforward formula is the precise nature of measuring the human
element of proportionality itself. Remaining unanswered is how to
apply the proportionality test, which is performed ex ante and often
involves a subjective analysis of various risks, as well as the following
questions:
What values should one assign to each of the competing
variables? In particular, how should one measure each
military advantage against human lives? How should one
assess the worth of human lives on both sides of the conflict?
Are the parties entitled to protect their own citizens or
114 Franck, supra note 3, at 737.
115 Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Galic', Case No. IT-98-29-A, ¶¶ 6-7 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006)).
116 Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT--95-14/2--A, ¶426 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004)).
11 Karen P. Seifert, Interpreting the Law of War: Rewriting the Rules of Engagement to
Police Iraq, 92 MINN. L. REV. 836, 882 (2008).
..Id. at 856-57 (quoting C. Peter Dungan, Rules of Engagement and Fratricide
Prevention: Lessons from the Tarnak Farms Incident, 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 301, 312 (2004)).
119 Isayeva v. Russ, App. No. 57950/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
120 Cohen, supra note 63, at 34-35.
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soldiers at the cost of endangering uninvolved enemy
civilians, and if so, at what ratio?121
V. CONCLUSION
Many international legal systems abide by proportionality
limitations, and under international humanitarian law and applicable
rules of engagement, members of the military are obligated to limit the
use of force. Determining what measures are proportionate is difficult
because of the modern changes in warfare and the inherent subjectivity
of the proportionality analysis, although several suggested juridical
models serve as guidance on the matter.
12 1 Id. at 29.
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